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ABSTRACT. We show that alternating Turing machines, with a novel and natural definition of accep-
tance, accept precisely the inductive (Π11) languages. Total alternating machines, that either accept
or reject each input, accept precisely the hyper-elementary (∆11) languages. Moreover, bounding the
permissible number of alternations yields a characterization of the levels of the arithmetical hierar-
chy. Notably, these results use simple finite computing devices, with finitary and discrete operational
semantics, and neither the results nor their proofs make any use of transfinite ordinals.
Our characterizations elucidate the analogy between the polynomial-time hierarchy and the arith-
metical hierarchy, as well as between their respective limits, namely polynomial-space and Π11.
1. INTRODUCTION
Inductive definitions via first-order positive operators constitute a broad computation paradigm. A
fundamental result of computation theory, formulated in various guises over the last century, identi-
fies the languages obtained by such definitions with those explicitly definable by Π11 formulas, that
is where second order quantification, over functions or relations, is restricted to positive occurrences
of ∀. This central link was first discovered by Suslin in 1916 for sets of real numbers [16]. Kleene
independently rediscovered the correspondence for sets of natural numbers (and so for languages)
[6, 5]. Spector formulated the basic notions more explicitly [15], and Moschovakis, Barwise, and
Gandy established the characterization for near-arbitrary countable first-order structures in 1971.
This characterization of Π11 in terms of inductive definability endows it with many of the structural
properties of the computably enumerable (RE) sets, and suggests an analogy between computability
based on finite processes, captured by Σ01, and a generalized form of computability based on infinite
processes.
Our aim here is to capture the full power of inductive definability by a novel and natural defi-
nition of acceptance for alternating Turing machines. This is unrelated to notions of “infinite-time
computations” that have been investigated repeatedly over the decades.
Alternation in computational and definitional processes is an idea that has appeared and reap-
peared in various guises over the last 50 odd years. Kleene’s definition of the arithmetical hierarchy
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in terms of quantifier alternation was an early manifestation, extended by Kleene, Spector, Gandy
and others to the transfinite hyper-arithmetical hierarchy [14, 1]. An explicit link with alternation
was discovered by Moschovakis [13, 12, 7], who characterized the inductive sets by a game quanti-
fier [12, Theorem 5C2]. Harel and Kozen [3] showed how this characterization can be expressed in
terms of an idealized programming language with random existential and universal assignments.
Alternating control made an entry into Computation Theory with the definition, by Chandra,
Kozen and Stockmeyer, of alternating Turing machines [2], where existential and universal variants
of non-determinism mesh. A state declared existential accepts when some child-configuration ac-
cepts, whereas a universal state accepts if all child-configurations accept. A computation can thus
alternate between existential and universal phases. The striking result of [2], which has become a
classic and has made its way into numerous textbooks, is that alternating Turing machines eluci-
date a powerful and elegant interplay between time and space complexity. Namely, for reasonable
functions f the languages accepted by alternating Turing machines in time O(f) are precisely the
languages accepted by deterministic machines in space O(f), and the languages accepted by al-
ternating machines in space O(f) are those accepted by deterministic machines in time 2O(f). In
particular, alternating polynomial time is precisely polynomial space. Moreover, when only fewer
than k alternations are allowed, one obtains the k’th level of the polynomial time hierarchy.
We establish here a formal parallel between the logical and the complexity-theoretic develop-
ments of alternation. Our point of departure is a simple and natural modification of the definition of
acceptance by an alternating Turing machine, where acceptance by a universal configuration c will
now refer to all configurations that end the universal computation-phase spawned by c, rather than
just to the immediate children of c. We prove that a language is accepted by such a machine iff it
is inductive (Π11). Moreover, when up to k alternations are allowed, we obtain the k’th levels of the
arithmetical hierarchy. Also, if a language L is accepted by a machine which is total, in the sense
that every input is either accepted or rejected, then L is hyper-arithmetical (∆11).
Note that our machines are no different from traditional alternating Turing machines: the differ-
ence lies only in the definition of acceptance. In particular, no infinitary rules, such as game quan-
tifiers or random assignments, are used. We thus obtain here a direct correspondence between Π11
and polynomial space, and between the arithmetical hierarchy and the polynomial-time hierarchy.
The two sides of this correspondence are characterized by the same alternating Turing machines,
but with a global (potentially infinitary) definition of acceptance for the former, and a local one for
the latter.
The author is grateful to Yiannis Moschovakis for important comments on an early draft of this
paper.
2. GLOBAL SEMANTICS FOR ALTERNATING COMPUTATIONS
2.1. Alternating Turing machines. The following will be used as reserved symbols, which we
posit to occur only when explicitly referred to: ⊔ for the blank symbol, + for the cursor-forward
command, and − for cursor-backward. We consider primarily single-tape machines. Given a finite
alphabet Σ, an alternating Turing machine (ATM) over Σ is a device M consisting of
(1) Disjoint finite sets E (existential states) and U (universal states). Elements of Q = E ∪ U are
the states.
(2) An element s0 ∈ Q, dubbed the start state.
(3) A finite alphabet Γ ⊇ Σ ∪ {⊔} (the machine alphabet).
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(4) A relation δ ⊆ (Q × Γ) × (A × Q), where A = Γ ∪ {−,+} is the set of actions.1 δ may
be construed as a multi-valued function, with domain Q× Γ and co-domain A ×Q. We write
q
γ(a)
−−−−→
M
q′ for (q, γ, a, q′) ∈ δ, and omit the subscript M when in no danger of confusion.
A configuration (cfg) (of M ) is a tuple (q, u, γ, v) with q ∈ Q, u, v ∈ Γ∗, and γ ∈ Γ. A cfg is said
to be existential or universal according to the state therein. The definition of a yield relation c⇒ c′
between configurations is defined as usual; that is, it is generated inductively by the conditions:2
• If q γ(+)−−−−→
M
q′ then (q, u, γ, τv)⇒ (q′, uγ, τ , v) and (q, u, γ, ε)⇒ (q′, uγ, ⊔, ε);3
• If q γ(−)−−−−→
M
q′ then (q, uτ , γ, v) ⇒ (q′, u, τ , γv) and (q, ε, γ, v) ⇒ (q′, ε, γ, v) (i.e.
the cursor does not move); and
• If q γ(τ)−−−−→
M
q′ then (q, u, γ, v)⇒ (q′, u, τ , v).
Following [8] we dispense here with accepting and rejecting states: when no transition applies
to a universal cfg then it has no children, and so the condition for acceptance is satisfied vacuously.
Dually, a dead-end existential cfg is rejecting. For brevity we also write configurations (q, u, γ, v)
as a pairs (q, w), where the understanding is that w is a “cursored string” uγv.
2.2. Acceptance and rejection. The computation tree of M for cfg c is a finitely-branching (but
potentially infinite) tree TM (c) of cfg-occurrences 〈α, c〉, α being the node-address and c the cfg,
where the children of 〈α, c〉 are 〈iα, ci〉 with ci the i-th cfg c′ such that c ⇒ c′ (under some fixed
ordering of the transition rules of δ).
We write c−→
∃
c′ when c ⇒ c′ and c is existential, c−→
∃
c′ if c−→
∃
∗c′ and c′ is universal. (As
usual, −→
∃
∗ is the reflexive and transitive closure of −→
∃
.) In other words, the universal cfg c′ can
be reached from the cfg c by successive applications of the yield relation ⇒, where all intermediate
states are existential.
The definitions of c−→
∀
c′ and c−→
∀
c′ are similar. We call a cfg c′ as above, for either −→
∃
or
−→
∀
, an alternation-pivot (for c).
The set AC of accepted configurations is generated inductively by the following closure condi-
tions:
(1) If c is existential and c′ ∈ AC for some c′ such that c−→
∃
c′, then c ∈ AC .
(2) If c is universal and c′ ∈ AC for all c′ such that c−→
∀
c′, then c ∈ AC .
If S is any set of configurations, we write CC[S] for the conjunction of the conditions above for S.
That is,
(1) If c is existential and c′ ∈ S for some c′ such that c−→
∃
c′, then c ∈ S.
(2) If c is universal and c′ ∈ S for all c′ such that c−→
∀
c′, then c ∈ S.
Thus, AC is generated by the closure conditions CC[AC]. Note that CC[S] is a Π02 formula. For
instance, (2) can be expressed as
∀ cfg c ((∀ traces witnessing a relation c−→
∀
c′) c′ ∈ S) → c ∈ S
1We follow here the convention whereby Turing machines either move their cursor or overwrite it, but not both.
2Note that inductive definitions posit implicitly an exclusivity condition, so the “only if” direction is not needed.
3We write ε for the empty string.
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Thus, the set AC of accepted configurations is explicitly definable as the set of configurations c
satisfying the Π11 formula
∀S (CC[S]→ c ∈ S)
Similarly, the set RC of rejected configurations is generated inductively by closure conditions dual
to the ones above:
(1) If c is existential and c′ ∈ RC for all c′ such that c−→
∃
c′, then c ∈ RC .
(2) If c is universal and c′ ∈ RC for some c′ such that c−→
∀
c′, then c ∈ RC .
Again, RC is explicitly definable by a Π11 formula.
We say that a state is dead-end if no transition rule applies to it. A universal dead-end state is
an accept-state, and an existential dead-end state a reject-state.
The initial configuration of the machine M for input w is 〈s0, ε, ⊔, w〉. M accepts an input
string w if the initial cfg for w is in the set AC of accepted configurations, as defined above. Dually,
M rejects w if that cfg is in RC. For example, if M has only universal states, then no computation
tree can have an alternation-pivot, and so every w is accepted. The computation tree for w may well
have leaves, that is dead-end configurations, but since here these are all universal configurations
with no children, they are accepted. Dually, if M has only existential states, then no input can
be accepted. These examples are merely consequences of our choice to represent acceptance and
rejection by dead-end universal and existential configurations, respectively. For example, a usual
non-deterministic Turing machine can be obtained simply by considering each accept-state as a
universal state with no applicable transition rule.
The language accepted by an ATM M is
L(M) = {w ∈ Σ∗ |M accepts w}
and the language rejected by M is
L¯(M) = {w ∈ Σ∗ |M rejects w}
It is easy to see that L(M) ∩ L¯(M) = ∅. Our definitions of acceptance and rejection of configu-
rations conform to the local closure conditions of acceptance (and rejection) of usual ATMs, as we
point out in the next Proposition. However, those conditions cannot be used to define acceptance
and rejection, because we allow infinite computation trees.
Proposition 2.1. Let M be an ATM, T a computation tree of M for input w. If c is a cfg in the tree,
with children c1 . . . cm, then
(1) If c is existential, then c is accepted iff some ci is accepted, and c is rejected iff all ci’s are
rejected.
(2) If c is universal, then c is accepted iff all ci’s are accepted, and c is rejected iff some ci is
rejected.
Proof. Let c be existential. If c is an accepted cfg, i.e. c−→
∃
c′ for some accept-state c′, then ci−→
∃
∗c′
for some ci, since c itself is existential. If that ci is existential, then it is accepted, by definition; and
if it is not, then ci = c′, which is accepted by assumption.
Conversely, suppose that some ci is accepted. If ci is universal, then c−→
∃
c′, and so c is ac-
cepted, by definition of acceptance. If ci is existential, then there must be an accepted c′ such that
ci−→
∃
∗c′; but then c−→
∃
∗c′, so c is accepted.
Other cases are proved similarly.
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2.3. Divergence and totality. An ATM may well neither accept nor reject an input string w. For
example, if the computation tree of M for a given input w has infinitely many alternation-pivots
along each computation-trace (a situation that we can engineer fairly easily), then M neither accepts
nor rejects that input. Indeed, the empty set satisfies the closure conditions for acceptance of w, as
well as the closure conditions for rejection.
We say that an ATMM is total if every input is either accepted or rejected byM . Let us identify
a simple condition that guarantees totality. We say that a computation tree is alternation well-
founded if no branch has infinitely many alternation-pivots. An ATM is alternation well-founded if
all its computations are alternation well-founded.
Proposition 2.2. If an ATM is alternation well-founded then it is total.
Proof. We prove the contra-positive: if a cfg c is neither accepted nor rejected, then the computation
tree T that it spawns has a branch with infinitely many alternation-pivots.
Suppose c is universal. Since c is not accepted, we must have c−→
∀
c′ for some alternation-
pivot c′ which is not accepted. And since c is also not rejected, all of its alternation-pivots, and
in particular c′, are not rejected. If c is existential, a dual argument shows that c−→
∀
c′ for some
alternation-pivot c′ which is neither accepted nor rejected.
Iterating the argument we obtain a branch with an infinite sequence c0 = c, c1 = c′, . . . of
successive alternation-pivots, all of which are neither accepted nor rejected.
The converse of Proposition 2.2 fails. Indeed, it is easy to construct a total ATM that is not al-
ternation well-founded, by inserting innocuous computation traces with infinitely many alternation-
pivots, with no impact on the acceptance or rejection of the input. See the proof of Proposition 2.4
below.
2.4. Duality and one-sidedness. The dual of an ATM M is the machine M¯ whose transition rela-
tion is that of M , but with the sets of universal and existential states interchanged, that is with M ’s
sets U and E as the sets of existential and universal states, respectively.
Directly from the definitions we have
Proposition 2.3. Let M¯ be the dual of M . Then L(M¯) = L¯(M), whence also L¯(M¯) = L(M).
A machine M is one-sided if it either has no accepted configurations, or no rejected configura-
tions.
Proposition 2.4. For every machine M there are one-sided machines M+ and M− such that
L(M) = L(M+), and L¯(M) = L¯(M−).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the conversion of a deterministic TM to a TM that diverges for any
input it does not accept.
Let M+ be obtained from M by expanding its transition relation as follows. Using auxiliary
states and transitions, we add for every existential state a transition into an auxiliary universal state
that starts an infinite trace (using auxiliary states) of alternation-pivots. That is, we create a fresh
alternation-pivot following each existential cfg, where that alternation-pivot is neither accepted nor
rejected. Each state accepted in M is accepted in M+, because no existential configuration is
loosing any pivot by the modification. And if a state is accepted in M+, then it is accepted in M ,
because the set A of configurations of M+ that consists just of the accepting configurations of M
satisfies the closure conditions AC for M+, and therefore contains the set of configurations accepted
by M+ (which is the minimal such set).
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But M+ has no rejected configurations: existential configurations cannot be rejected because
they have an alternation-pivot, namely the one introduced by the definition of M+, which is not
rejected. And then universal configurations cannot be rejected, because all their alternation-pivots,
which are existential, are non-rejected.
The construction of M− is dual.
2.5. The Arithmetical Hierarchy. We say that an ATM M is Σk if its initial state is existential,
and for every w ∈ Σ∗, all branches of the computation-tree for w have ≤ k alternation-pivots. The
definition of Πk machines is similar, but with a universal initial state. Here again we posit that the
existential states of Π1 machines have no applicable transition rules.
Theorem 2.5. Let k ≥ 1. A language is Σ0k (Π0k) iff it is accepted by a Σk (Πk, respectively) ATM.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. For the base case Σ01, let L be a language defined by a Σ01
formula, that is
L = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ϕ[x]}
where
ϕ[x] ≡ ∃w1, . . . , wr ϕ0[~w, x]
with ϕ0 a bounded formula, i.e. with all quantifiers bounded (under the substring relation). Define
a Σ1 machine M that accepts L, as follows. M branches existentially to choose a string w =
w1# · · ·#wr, then proceeds to check deterministically that ϕ0[w1 . . . wr]. (We classify the states
for that deterministic process to be universal, so that dead-end states are accepted.)
For the converse, note first that in a Σ1 computation tree the universal configuration are all
accepted, since they have no pivots. So acceptance by a a Σ1 machine M is definable by the Σ01
formula that states, for input w, the existence of a finite tree of configurations, related by the rules
of M , with the initial configuration for w as root, of which the internal nodes are existential and the
leaves are universal.
For the base case Π01, suppose L is defined by a Π01 formula
ϕ[x] ≡ ∀w1 . . . wr ϕ0[w1, . . . , wr, x]
Define a Π1 machine M that accepts L, as follows. M generates strings w1# · · ·#wr in successive
lexicographic order. After each such choice M branches universally to the next string as well as to
a deterministic module that accepts x iff ϕ0[~w, x] for the current value of w1# · · ·#wr.
Conversely, if L = L(M) where M is an Π1 machine, then L is definable by a formula that
states that for all (finite) computation traces, the trace’s last configuration is not existential (i.e.
rejected).
The induction step generalizes the induction basis: The properties above are proved for level
k+1 of the Arithmetical Hierarchy by referring to sub-computations at level k, rather than to deter-
ministic sub-computations.
3. ALTERNATION AND INDUCTIVE LANGUAGES
3.1. Accepted languages are inductive. Fix an alphabet Σ. Consider formulas over the vocabulary
(i.e. similarity type) with an identifier for each letter in Σ as well as for the empty-string, a binary
function-identifier for concatenation, and a binary relation for the substring relation.
Proposition 3.1. The following conditions are equivalent for a language L ⊆ Σ∗.
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I1: L is defined by a formula of the form ∀f ϕ[w, f ], where ϕ is first-order and f ranges over
Σ∗ → Σ∗.
I2: L is defined by a formula of the form ∀f ∃x ϕ0[w, f, x], where ϕ0 is a bounded formula, i.e.
with each quantifier restricted to substrings of some string.
I3: L is defined by a formula of the form ∀f ∃x ϕ0[w, f¯(x), x], where f¯(x) abbreviates the string
f(0)# · · ·#f(|x|) (with # a fresh symbol, used as a textual separator).
I4: L is defined by a formula of the form ∀S ∃x ∀y ϕ0[w, f, x, y], where S ranges over subsets of
Σ∗.
Proof. I1 implies I2 by the Kuratowski-Tarski algorithm [11]. I2 implies I3 by the boundedness of
ϕ0. I1 implies I4 by an interpretation of functions by relations (and hence sets, since we are talking
about languages), and I3 and I4 each implies I1 trivially.
Note that the use of a set quantifier in I4 necessitates an alternation of first-order quantifiers,
which is not needed in I1. This is essential: without the presence of the first-order universal quanti-
fier ∀y we get Kreisel’s strict-Π11 formulas, which are no more expressive than Σ01 [9, 10].
A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is inductive (Π11) when it satisfies the equivalent conditions of Proposition
3.1 (see e.g. [4]).
Recall that our definition above of acceptance by an ATM refers to the set AC of accepted
configurations, which is Π11 definable. We therefore have:
Proposition 3.2. Every language accepted by an ATM is inductive.
3.2. Inductive languages are accepted.
Proposition 3.3. Every inductive language is accepted by an ATM.
Proof. We refer to characterization (I3) of Π11 languages. As usual, Σn stands for the set of strings
over Σ of length n. Let L be a language defined by
∀f∃x ϕ0[w, f¯(x), x]
which we write momentarily as
∀f ∃x ϕ0[w, z0# · · ·#zn, x]
where n = |x| and zi = f(i). This is equivalent to the following infinite formula (where, as usual,
Σn is the set of strings of length n).
ϕ0[w, ε, ε]
∨ ∀z0 (∃x ∈ Σ1 ϕ0[w, z0, x])
∨ ∀z1 (∃x ∈ Σ2 ϕ0[w, z0# z1, x])
∨ ∀z2 (∃x ∈ Σ3 ϕ0[w, z0# z1# z2, x])
∨ ∀z3 (∃x ∈ Σ4 ϕ0[w, z0 # z1# z2# z3, x])
∨ · · ·
(3.1)
We use here infinitary formulas for informal expository purpose; compare [12, 13].
Formula (3.1) is captured by an ATM which, on input w,
(1) checks deterministically ϕ0[w, ε, ε]; if this fails,
(2) chooses by universal nondeterminism a value z0;4
4Recall from the introduction that such a choice, for our finitely-branching machine, involves a computation tree with
an infinite branch.
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(3) for each such choice for z0, branches by existential nondeterminism to
(a) guess (by existential nondeterminism) an x ∈ Σ, then check (deterministically) ϕ0[w, z0, x];
if this fails
(b) choose by universal nondeterminism a z1;
(c) etc.
Combining Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 we conclude:
Theorem 3.4. L is inductive iff it is accepted by an ATM.
4. TOTAL MACHINES AND HYPER-ARITHMETICAL LANGUAGES
A basic result of computation theory is the characterization of decidable languages in terms of
semi-decidability:
Theorem 4.1. A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is accepted by a Turing machine that terminates for all input iff
both L and its complement are accepted by a Turing machine.
The analog of Theorem 4.1 is
Theorem 4.2. A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is accepted by a total ATM iff both L and its complement
L¯ = Σ∗ − L are accepted by an ATM.
The forward implication of the Theorem is easy: If a language L is accepted by a total ATM
M then the dual machine M¯ accepts L¯, by by Proposition 2.3.
Towards proving below the converse implication, assume that L = L(M0) and L¯ = L(N). By
Proposition 2.4 we may assume that neither machine has rejected configurations. Thus L¯ is rejected
by the machine M1 = N¯ , which has no accepted cfg. We wish to construct out of M0 and M1 a
total machine M that accepts L and rejects L¯. A naive emulation of the standard proof of Theorem
4.1 would swap control between M0 and M1 after each computation step. That is, M is defined as
a two-tape machine, whose states are tuples 〈q0, q1, j〉, with qi a state of Mi, and where j ∈ {0, 1}
indicates which machine is to make a move. The type of 〈q0, q1, j〉 (existential or universal) is the
type of qj . Since M1 has no accepted cfg, a cfg c of M would be accepted when its M0 component
is accepted by M0; and since M0 has no rejected configurations, c would be rejected in M if its M1
component is rejected by M1.
However, the construction above does not work for our ATMs, due to the global definition
of acceptance. Consider a universal cfg c0 of M0, which is accepted in M0 because it has no
pivots. When c0 is coupled in M with a universal cfg c1 of M1, the combined cfg may spawn a
computation tree with pivots of M1, whose M0-component is not accepted in M0. The combined
cfg is not accepted then in M , even though c0 is accepted in M0.
We consider instead a merge of M0 and M1 where control swap from a universal phase of M0
to M1 is delayed until that phase has ended, and dually for an existential phase of M1.
Note that for simple Turing machines (deterministic or nondeterministic) phases coincide with
computation steps, since no universal configurations are present.
More precisely, we posit, without loss of generality, that M0 and M1 are single-tape ATM’s
over a common input alphabet Σ, and using a common extended alphabet Γ ⊂ Σ ∪ {⊔}. The
combined machine M is then defined as follows.
• M is a two-tape ATM, whose states of interest are tuples 〈q0, q1, j〉, with qi a state of Mi, (i =
0, 1). The type of 〈q0, q1, j〉 (existential or universal) is the type of qj (in Mj).
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• In addition, M has auxiliary states and (deterministic) transitions that pre-process its computation
by copying the input into the second tape, reinitializing the cursor positions, and passing control
to a state 〈s0, s1, 0〉, where si is the initial state of Mi.
• For γ, δ ∈ Γ, α ∈ {+,−} ∪ Γ,
if q0
γ(α)
−→ p0 is a rule of M0 then
– If both q0 and p0 are universal, then
〈q0, q1, 0〉
γ,δ(α,δ)
−−−−−→ 〈p0, q1, 0〉
i.e. on reading γ on the first tape, and δ on the second, M performs action α on component 0
of the cfg, action δ (i.e. no-op) on component 1, and leaves control to component 0.
– Otherwise, i.e. if at least one of q0, p0 is existential, then
〈q0, q1, 0〉
γ,δ(α,δ)
−−−−−→ 〈p0, q1, 1〉
• If q1
γ(α)
−→ p1 is a rule of M1, then
– If both q1 and p1 are existential, then
〈q0, q1, 1〉
γ,δ(α,δ)
−−−−−→ 〈q0, p1, 1〉
– Otherwise, i.e. if at least one of q1, p1 is universal, then
〈q0, q1, 1〉
γ,δ(α,δ)
−−−−−→ 〈q0, p1, 0〉
Proposition 4.3. Assume that no string is both accepted by M0 and rejected by M1. Then M
accepts every string accepted by M0.
Proof. We prove that if M0 accepts a cfg (q0, u0) then, for every non-rejected cfg (q1, u1) of M1,
M accepts (〈q0, q1, 0〉, 〈u0, u1〉). If M0 accepts u, then (by assumption) M1 does not reject it, and
so the Proposition follows by considering the cfg (〈, s0, s1, 0〉, 〈u, u〉).
Define the set A of M0-configurations by
A = {(q0, u0) | (〈q0, q1, 0〉, 〈u0, u1〉) is accepted in M
for all non-rejected configurations (q1, u1) of M1 }
We show that A satisfies the closure conditions defining the set of configurations accepted by M0.
• The existential closure condition: Suppose that (q0, u0)−→
∃
(p0, w0), where (p0, w0) ∈ A, and
the reduction sequence is of length n ≥ 1.5 We prove that (q0, u0) ∈ A by induction on n.
Let (q0, u0)−→
∃
(r0, v0)−→
∃
(p0, w0). Note, first, that we must have (r0, v0) ∈ A: if n = 1 then
(r0, v0) = (p0, w0) ∈ A, and if n > 1 then (r0, v0) ∈ A by IH.
Towards proving that (q0, u0) ∈ A let (q1, u1) be a non-rejected cfg of M1. We have
(〈q0, q1, 0〉, 〈u0, u1〉) −→
∃
(〈r0, q1, 1〉, 〈v0, u1〉)
We show that (〈r0, q1, 1〉, 〈v0, u1〉) is accepted in M , whence so is (〈q0, q1, 0〉, 〈u0, u1〉).
We have the following cases.
– q1 is universal. Each M1-cfg (r1, v1) such that (q1, u1)−→
∀
(r1, v1) must be non-rejected, since
(q1, u1) is non-rejected. We have
(〈r0, q1, 1〉, 〈v0, u1〉) −→
∀
(〈r0, r1, 0〉, 〈v0, v1〉)
5
n = 0 is excluded, since by definition of −→
∃
the state q0 is existential and p0 is universal.
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and the latter cfg is accepted, since (r0, v0) ∈ A and (r1, v1) is non-rejected. It follows that
(〈r0, q1, 1〉, 〈v0, u1〉) is accepted in M .
– q1 is existential. Since (q1, u1) is non-rejected, it follows that (q1, u1)−→
∃
(r1, v1) for some
non-rejected cfg (r1, v1) of M1. By definition of M , we have
(〈r0, q1, 1〉, 〈v0, u1〉) −→
∃
(〈r0, r1, 0〉, 〈v0, v1〉)
The latter cfg is accepted, since (r0, v0) ∈ A, and (r1, v1) is non-rejected. It follows that
(〈r0, q1, 1〉, 〈v0, u1〉) is accepted in M .
We have thus shown that if (q0, u0)−→
∃
(p0, w0), where (p0, w0) ∈ A, then (q0, u0) ∈ A.
• The universal closure condition: Suppose that for all (p0, w0), if (q0, u0)−→
∀
(p0, w0) then
(p0, w0) ∈ A. Towards showing that (q0, u0) ∈ A, let (q1, u1) be a non-rejected cfg of M1.
By definition of M , if (〈q0, q1, 0〉, 〈u0, u1〉) −→
∀
C , where C is a cfg of M , then C =
(〈p0, q1, 1〉, 〈w0, u1〉), where (q0, u0)−→
∀
(p0, w0).
We show that (〈p0, q1, 1〉, 〈w0, u1〉) is accepted in M for each such (p0, w0), implying that
(〈q0, q1, 0〉, 〈u0, u1〉) is accepted.
We have the following cases.
– q1 is universal. Suppose (q1, u1)−→
∀
(p1, v1). Then
(〈p0, q1, 1〉, 〈w0, u1〉) −→
∀
(〈p0, p1, 0〉, 〈w0, v1〉)
The cfg (p1, v1) must be non-rejected, since (q1, u1) is non-rejected. Since (p0, w0) ∈ A, it
follows that (〈p0, p1, 0〉, 〈w0, v1〉) is accepted. This being the case for every (p1, v1) as above,
we conclude that (〈p0, q1, 1〉, 〈w0, u1〉) is accepted.
– q1 is existential. Since (q1, u1) is non-rejected, it follows that (q1, u1)−→
∃
(p1, v1) for some
non-rejected configuration (p1, v1) of M1. By definition of M , we have
(〈p0, q1, 1〉, 〈w0, u1〉) −→
∃
(〈p0, p1, 0〉, 〈w0, v1〉)
The latter configuration is accepted in M , since (p0, w0) ∈ A and (p1, v1) is non-rejected. It
follows that (〈p0, q1, 1〉, 〈w0, u1〉) is also accepted,
We have thus shown that if (p0, w0) ∈ A whenever (q0, u0)−→
∀
(p0, w0), then (q0, u0) ∈ A, that
is A satisfies the universal closure condition for acceptance in M0.
Since A satisfies both the existential and the universal closure conditions for acceptance in M0, it
follows that A contains every accepting cfg of M0, proving the Proposition.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 — Concluded. We have noted already the forward implication. We show
that if L and L¯ are accepted by ATM’s, then L is accepted by a total ATM.
Let L = L(M0) and L¯ = L(N), and refer to the machines M1 and M of the discussion above.
By Proposition 4.3, M accepts every string accepted by M0.
An argument dual to that in the proof of Proposition 4.3 shows that M rejects every cfg
(〈q0, q1〉, 〈u0, u1〉), where M1 rejects (q1, u1) and M0 does not accept (q0, u0). In particular, assum-
ing M1 rejects an input string u, M rejects (〈t0, s1, 1〉, 〈v, u〉) whenever (t0, v) is a non-accepted
configuration of M0.
A small extra step is needed to account for the fact that M0, and not M1, has the initial control
in M . Posit, without loss of generality, that the initial state s0 of M0 is existential and deterministic
(i.e. at most one transition applies). Since M0 does not accept u, we must have (s0, u)−→
∃
(t0, v)
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where (t0, v) is a non-accepted cfg. But then the unique initial transition of M (past the initialization
phase) is
(〈s0, s1, 0〉, 〈u, u〉)−→
∃
(〈t0, s1, 1〉, 〈v, u〉)
Since M1 rejects (s1, u) and M0 does not accept (t0, v), M must reject (〈t0, s1, 1〉, 〈v, u〉), as noted
above, and therefore must also reject (〈s0, s1, 0〉, 〈u, u〉).
In conclusion, M accepts every string accepted by M0, and rejects every string rejected by M1.
So M is a total machine that accepts L and rejects L¯.
5. CONCLUSION
The combined use of existential and universal nondeterminism has been of interest primarily in
Computational Complexity theory, but has not been considered thus far as a tool in the foundations
of computing. This is because the semantics of acceptance has been defined “locally”, that is in
terms of the relation between computational configurations and their immediate descendants. That
semantics implies that acceptance (and rejection) are witnessed by finite computation trees, and thus
cannot lead us beyond the semi-decidable (RE) languages. Viewed from another angle, the closure
properties involved are Π01, and so the accepted languages are defined by strict-Π11 formulas (see
§3.1 above).
We showed here that a very natural alternative semantics for universal nondeterminism changes
the picture radically, as the languages accepted are precisely the Π11 ones. This further illustrates
the foundational analogy between alternation in feasible time with local semantics, which yields
PSpace as a limit of the PTime Hierarchy (starting with PTime and NP), and alternation for arbi-
trary computations with global semantics, which yields Π11 as a limit of the arithmetical hierarchy
(starting with Σ01).
Generalized models of computation that go beyond computability have been studied exten-
sively, of course. The novelty of the approach here is that it refers to the very same hardware as
traditional Turing machines (albeit with both modes of nondeterminism), but redefines the notion
of acceptance, in a way that remains consistent with the underlying, intuitive, intent.
The ability to refer to both computational complexity and higher recursion theory using the
same machine models has the potential of suggesting analogies between results, and thereby transfer
of results. We believe that this will provide insights and additional machine-based proofs for Higher
Recursion Theory.
The approach developed here seems to also break with past works in this area in that it dispenses
with transfinite recurrence and induction over Kleene’s constructive ordinals, and does not use any
transfinite stage-comparison technique. Instead, the proofs use inductive definitions directly.
Directly dealing with inductive definitions, without calibrating them by ordinals provides, in
fact, a closer analogy with finite computing. Computation traces of machines and of programs
are construed intuitively as finite objects, without direct reference to the natural numbers, either as
clocking computation steps or as codes for computational objects. Wit the frequent use of “structural
induction” and “structural recurrence.” It is, therefore, natural to expect that higher-order compu-
tation traces can be studied directly, without a detour through transfinite clocking by constructive
ordinals. The proof of Theorem 4.2 achieves precisely that.
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